

Toward the Realization of Peace: A Preliminary Fundamental Consideration

March 21, 2012

Ken Shigeta (Osaka university)

1 Introduction

The word peace has multiple meanings. Most prominently, it can be understood as an antonym of war. This meaning can be further interpreted in two different ways. The first is a state in which there is no actual war going on, and the second is a state in which even the possibility of war has been eradicated. As an instance of the first meaning, Japan has been in peace since August 15, 1945. However, it is very difficult to say that Japan is in peace in the second meaning because the Self-Defense Forces of Japan have the military capacity to make war although it seems contradictory to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Besides, it is in the second sense that Kant pursues the possibility of peace in *Perpetual Peace*¹.

Peace can be interpreted not as an antonym of war but of conflict or antagonism. Peace in this sense is predicated not on nation states but on individuals. The meaning can again be interpreted in either of the broad or narrow sense described above.

In this lecture I will examine the possibility of peace as an antonym of war in the second, narrow and rigorous, sense.

When considering the possibility of realizing peace in this sense, it is essential to genuinely and fundamentally examine such basic questions as “Should there not be a war at all?” and “If there should not be a war, how is it justified?” This examination is necessary because advocating the theory of peace without examining these basic questions is bound to turn into an empty exercise having no theoretical substance.

However, the question “Should there not be war?” cannot be translated into one in which subject is an individual because only a nation state can carry out a war. What, then, is the question that corresponds at the level of an individual? It is “Why should a person not kill another person?” The case a boy’s shocking murder in 1997 in Japan raised this issue. After the murder, in a TV program that covered the case, an undergraduate student asked, “Why should a person not kill others?” No critic who appeared on the program could answer the question, and the program came to an abrupt end. A

¹Cf., Kant, I, *Perpetual Peace*, by Latta, R (tr.), George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1903.

few days after the incident on TV, Kenzaburo Oe, a Japanese novelist, wrote a newspaper article² saying that raising such a question is an unworthy act that violates human dignity.

But why could the critics appearing on the program not respond to the question? Is it because the question seeks truism as well as asking an arithmetical question such as “Why should $68 + 57$ equal 125 ”? Because you can explain how the mathematical equation is produced, however self-evidently true it might be, you are also expected to be able to explain why a person should not kill another person. Why does Oe, then, want to prevent the student from raising the question? After all, no one asking “Why should $68 + 57$ equal 125 ?” is accused of violating human dignity.

Astute children are immediately aware of the insincerity or dishonesty in such adults’ responses. It is evident that ethical theories built on such insincerity cannot be convincing at all. The same can be stated about the question “Should there not be war?” Any theory of peace that suppresses an investigation of such a basic question cannot help but be vacuous.

In this lecture, I will provide answers to both questions as clearly and straightforwardly as possible from an innocent child’s viewpoint, in other words, from a philosophical viewpoint.

But why do I need to treat both questions at the same time? Indeed, one should refrain from carelessly assimilating nation states and individuals. Nation states cannot be equated to the sum of individuals because the simple aggregation of individuals does not necessarily result in the composition of a nation state. Yet, nation states cannot be composed without individuals.

The reason why I will address the ethics of nation states together with those of individuals is that comparing them and clarifying their similarities and differences will help shed light on the particular properties of nation states as sovereign powers. I believe that this consideration will help to develop a more substantial process toward peace.

2 Why should a person not kill another?

Let me introduce world model P to investigate the question. This world is composed of five persons: M, N, H, K, S (see Figure 1). Let us assume this to be a simple model of the world³.

Here, I will make one important presupposition: All five persons in this world want to stay alive, that is, they have desires that they want to fulfill. The implication of this presupposition will be made more explicit through the following argument.

Presupposition of world model P: All individuals in world model P want to stay alive. They have desires that they want to fulfill.

²Cf., Oe, Kenzaburo, ‘Hokori, Yumoa, Sozoryoku,’ *Asahi Shimbun*, Nov. 30, 1997.

³The argument in this section is largely in debt to Hitoshi Nagai’s meta-ethical argument. His thought is based especially on his insightful interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy of ethics. Cf., Nagai, H and Koizumi, Y, *Naze Hito wo Koroshitewaikenainoka?* Kawadeshobosinsya, 1998. Nagai, H, *Rinri towa Nanika*, Sangyotosyo, 2003.

In this primal situation, each of the five persons is supposed to agree with the others to contract a normative rule that a person should not kill the others. This is required because without the implementation of this norm, a person might be killed by the others before being able to satisfy his desires. A world in which murders are not likely to occur, given the norm, is more desirable for these five persons than one without the norm, in which they are more likely to occur. That is to say, each person is supposed to select the world where the norm that a person should not kill the other persons is effective rather than the one that lacks the norm.

Let us suppose that M has a peculiar taste, different from the other four, and is sometimes seized with an impulse to kill others. He is very aware of this impulse and waits for an opportunity to commit murder. Will he, then, refuse to contract the norm because of his peculiar taste? No. For he does not want to be killed by others before getting the opportunity to commit murder. In other words, he will want to commit murder without being killed. That is to say, in general, a world in which murders are not likely to occur, given the norm, is more desirable to M than one in which they are more likely to occur because it lacks the norm. Therefore, he would agree to contract the norm that a person should not kill the others.

It is a remarkable fact that a world with the norm that prohibits murder is more desirable than the one without it, even to the person who has a peculiar desire to commit murder and waits for the opportunity to do so.

What, then, can be said about the case in which M agrees publicly to contract the norm that prohibits murder, while deciding privately to violate the norm whenever it is possible for him to do so? Can someone persuade him in a rational manner that he should not commit murder or should not have committed murder? (For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that the person who attempts to persuade M does not belong to world model P, as this assumption will not have any significant influence on the substance of the following argument.) Let us examine prospective arguments that are likely to persuade M.

The first argument is based on the concept of contract. The persuasion would proceed like this: "Because you agree to contract the norm that a person should not kill other persons, you must observe it. Therefore, you must not commit murder." There are at least two possible counterarguments from M. The first reply could be "Actually I did not agree to contract the norm. I only pretended to do it. Therefore, it will not constrain me." Even if the persuader insists by countering, "Pretending to make contract is tantamount to deceiving others. Because it is a moral vice, you must not do it," it would be of no use. For M has cast doubt on the claim that individuals should be moral, including abiding by the prohibition of murder. The other possible reply by M would be "I agreed to contract the norm that a person should not kill other persons only as a means of realizing the purpose that I am not killed by others. Therefore, I will observe the norm only so far as it serves this purpose. Thus, I don't have to follow the norm if I can realize the purpose even when I commit murder."

The second persuasion tactic is based on, so to speak, the principle of mutual co-existence. "If you pretend to observe the norm that a person should not kill the others while deciding privately to violate it whenever you can, it means that you afford special treatment only to yourself. However, because every person coexists on the same plane in world model P, you are not entitled to behave in such a manner." M's counterargu-

ment against such a claim may be this: “There is a genuine reason why I am entitled to afford special treatment to myself. For I can only perceive the world from my point of view. The world exists only in that way. There is no room for doubt about that fact.”(see Figures 2, 3)

The last mode of persuasion appeals to weighing M’s advantages against disadvantages that accompany the act of committing murder. “If you commit murder, it is absolutely certain that the fact will be revealed by others. Consequently, a severe punishment will be imposed on you, even to death, depending on the circumstances. At best, you will be confined and deprived of freedom for a very long time. Even when you are liberated from the confinement, you will be compelled to lead your life feeling ashamed for the crime. That is, your act of committing murder won’t pay if you deliberately weigh up the advantages against disadvantages.” However it is not necessary but contingent that his murder would come to light. In other words, it is always possible that the murder committed by M will not be revealed and M will escape being punished for it. Therefore, when M gains rational ground for judging that it is highly probable for his act of murder to not come to light and he makes up his mind to commit murder, no rational argument is left to persuade M not to commit murder.

Let me summarize the questions and answers with M. In world model P, M agrees to contract the norm that a person should not kill other persons, but he decides privately to violate this norm whenever possible. I then proposed three prospective arguments or persuasions that might have enabled us to rationally prevent M from committing murder: (1) the argument based on M’s agreement to the contract, (2) the argument appealing to the principle of mutual coexistence, and (3) the argument based on weighing M’s advantages against the disadvantages involved in committing murder.

Against the argument based on the contract, M replies that (1) the norm cannot constrain him because he only pretended to agree to contract it or (2) he agreed to contract the norm that prohibits murder only so that the others would not be allowed to kill him; the norm cannot confine him when he can attain the purpose without observing the norm. Against the argument based on the principle of mutual coexistence, M answers that because the world could be perceived by M from his own viewpoint and exists only in that way for him, he is genuinely entitled to give special preference only to himself. Furthermore, against the argument based on weighing the advantages and disadvantages of committing murder, M replies that there are always cases in which committing murder pays off, as in the case where it would be quite probable that the murder or murderer would not be revealed. He insists then that this argument cannot be effective.

Let me discuss these arguments. First of all, I believe that basically there is no other effective argument that is based on moral stands, which prohibit any crime or moral vice, including murder. Second, the argument weighing the advantages and disadvantages seems to be the most effective. The first argument only presupposes the norm that a person should keep his promise. The second argument, based on the principle of mutual coexistence is, in fact, a falsehood because it attempts to lead one to believe in a world that in fact contradicts the actual world. Unlike the first argument, the third argument does not presuppose any moral claim, and unlike the second, it is true in most cases although not in every case.

However, if the presupposition of world model P is denied, almost all validity of

the third argument vanishes. Because if an individual has no particularly outstanding desire that he wants to satisfy and therefore does not want to stay alive, then there is little ground for preventing him from committing any moral vice based on the third argument.

3 Why should there not be a war?

Let us now examine the question “Why should there not be a war?” at the level of nation states. As in the previous section, I want to introduce a world model, N, which is composed of five nation states A, B, Γ, Δ, and E. Yet, as mentioned at the beginning, nation states are a type of agents different from individuals. To make the difference explicit, I will introduce a theoretical schema about the nation states.

3.1 Structure of modern nation states: Capital = State = Nation

According to the theory advocated by Kojin Karatani, a Japanese critic⁴, nation states are composed of a combination of three “exchange modes”: (A) reciprocity (gift and return), (B) redistribution (plunder and redistribution), and (C) commodity exchange (money and commodities). Let me confirm what each of the exchange modes signifies.

3.1.1 Reciprocity: Exchange Mode A

Karl Marx emphasizes that commodity exchange begins between communities. Is there, then, no exchange within the community? Yes, there is. A different type of exchange principle operates within a community, which is reciprocation in the form of the exchange of gift and return. Marcel Mauss, an anthropologist, has found that a reciprocation system existed in primitive society and that various types of things such as food, properties, women, land, labor, and ceremony were gifted and returned by members of a community, a practice that created a social structure. However, such reciprocity can be found in various other types of communities as well. Reciprocity certainly persists to the present day, even in an advanced society, although the more global is the spread of the capitalistic economy, the more transparent reciprocity becomes. For example parents’ care of their children is a type of reciprocity because it will imbue children with a feeling of debt, although it is undetermined whether they will make a return for such a debt. Reciprocity, as such, is an exchange mode that does not appear to be one.

3.1.2 Redistribution: Exchange Mode B

The possibility of one community plundering another by brute force precedes commodity exchange. When a community attempts to plunder the other not once but con-

⁴One of the most prominent achievements of Karatani is to have developed the possibility of Marx’s insight of capitalistic economy. I think that his theory introduced in this section is one of clearest and most convincing theory about contemporary world. Cf., Karatani, K, *Transcritique*, MIT press, 2003, *Sekaiishi no Kozo*, Iwanamisyoten, 2010, ‘*Sekaiishi no Kozo’wo Yomu*, Inscript inc. 2011, *Sekai kyowakoku e*, Iwanamishinsyo, 2006.

tinuously, it needs to establish a tribute system. In order to plunder continuously, the community that plunders needs to execute not one-sided robbery but various types of “redistribution.” For instance, it needs to implement such public projects as irrigation and flood-control, secure public welfare, and protect communities from external forces. Therefore, redistribution can also be considered a type of exchange mode that does not appear to be so, as is reciprocation.

3.1.3 Commodity Exchange: Exchange Mode C

Commodity exchange seems to be based on an agreement between equal parties; however, contrary to the appearance, the relationship in such an exchange is not between equals. Commodity exchange is the exchange of money for commodities. Money has “a pledge for direct exchangeability.” Owners of money can get others’ products and have them work without compulsion by brute force. Although owners of money and those of commodities appear to stand in an equal relationship, this is not the case. Therefore Commodity exchange is not an exchange based on an agreement between equal parties although it may appear to be so.

According to Karatani, each of the three exchange modes has existed as an indispensable component of the five social constitutions classified by Marx (primitive clanish, Asian, classical antiquity, feudalistic, and capitalistic). Depending on how these exchange modes are combined and which mode is most dominant, the five different social constitutions are composed of the three exchange modes (see Table 1).

The capitalistic social constitution, which has existed since the early modern period, is one in which commodity exchange mode is most dominant. In this constitution, redistribution, which had been the dominant exchange mode, seems to have vanished. Yet, it still persists, although in different forms. A state apparatus with a regular army and bureaucracy such as the Asian social constitution was established for the first time during the period of absolute monarchy in Western Europe. The feudalistic land rent has been transformed into different forms of land tax. Feudal lords were deprived of their feudal privileges by a monarch and became bureaucrats, to whom taxes were distributed as salaries. Absolute monarchy pretended to be a type of welfare state by redistributing the taxes. Additionally, a regular army and bureaucracy as the essentials of a nation state has persisted today after the sovereignty of the people was established by the bourgeois revolutions. That is to say, redistribution (exchange mode B) has stayed alive in the heart of modern nation states.

What, then, has happened to reciprocation? In the capitalistic social constitution, rural communities disappeared as the commodity economy spread. However, the community can be said to have reappeared in other shapes - as a nation. A nation is a “imagined community”⁵ based on the relationship of reciprocation. It provides imagined communality beyond the conflict and discrepancy between classes that result from the capitalistic system. Therefore, capitalistic social constitution can be said to be a combination of Capital = Nation = State (exchange modes C = A = B).

⁵Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities*, Verso Books, 1983.

3.2 Three reasons there should not be a war

Let me now introduce world model N, which is composed of five nation states, A, B, Γ , Δ , and E (see Figure 6). Here, I assume the following two premises for the sake of simplicity.

Presupposition 1 of world model N: Each nation state in this world model is a modern nation state (capitalistic social constitution). In other words, it is a combination of Capital = Nation = State (exchange mode C = A = B).

Presupposition 2 of world model N: Among nation states of this world model, no remarkable difference exists in the size (e.g., population and natural resources) or quality (e.g., degree of the development of the capitalistic economy, state apparatus: regular army or bureaucracy, education, or culture). In other words, they are well balanced.

Is the norm that there should not be a war contracted by members of world model N in this primal situation, as was correspondingly contracted that a person should not kill the others in world model P? The question cannot be answered so easily because a statute of international law that states that there should not be war has not yet come into existence in the actual world, although basically the Presupposition 1 of world model N is satisfied in the actual world. However, under Presupposition 2 of this world model, each nation state enjoys a certain degree of economic, political, and cultural quality in a well-balanced condition; therefore, it is highly probable that each of them thinks that a world in which wars are not likely to occur is desirable rather than one in which they are likely to occur. Then, they would agree to contract the norm that there should not be a war. Therefore, assuming that the norm is agreed to by each member in the model, I will examine the extent to which the norm is effective.

Furthermore, in this situation, it is possible that a nation state, for example nation Γ , publicly agrees to contract the norm while deciding to violate it whenever it is beneficial to do so. In this case, can you persuade this nation state through rational argument that it should not wage war?

It is reasonable to assume that the agent whom you are required to persuade here is an individual γ who represents nation state Γ following its legitimate procedure because a state apparatus that has no such representative seems to be irrational. In parallel with the case of an individual, following three types of arguments may possibly enable an intermediary to persuade the representative γ : (1) an argument based on the norm that Γ has agreed, (2) an argument appealing to the principle of mutual coexistence, and (3) an argument based on weighing Γ 's long-term advantages and disadvantages as a result of waging war. Focusing on the difference between this case and that of an individual, let us discuss each argument in order.

At first, the intermediary attempts to persuade γ in the following manner: "Because your nation Γ agreed to contract the norm that there should not be a war, Γ should not violate it." Against this argument, γ will reply that because his nation only pretends to agree to contract the norm, the norm cannot confine the nation. Alternatively, γ can claim: "I agreed to the norm that there should not be a war in order for

my nation Γ to not suffer a loss caused by war. Therefore, we can wage war when we can attain the purpose without observing the norm.”

Next, the intermediary can try to persuade γ on the basis of the principle of mutual coexistence that the special treatment given by γ to his nation Γ by privately deciding to violate the norm whenever it is beneficial cannot be justified because the five nations coexist on the same plane in world model N. Against this, γ 's counterargument may follow thus: “The world can be seen only from my (= γ 's) viewpoint. In fact, the world comes into existence only in that way. Since I am a citizen of Γ , I share interest with the nation state. Therefore, it is justified that I give preferential treatment to Γ among the five nations.” (see Figures 7)

Finally, the intermediary will attempt to make γ weigh nation state Γ 's long-term advantages and disadvantages in waging war. This persuasion makes the difference between nation states and individuals most evident. For it is possible that crimes by individuals will not be revealed, that is, they may be perfect crimes; however, it is impossible that a war by nation state is not revealed. This persuasion follows thus: “If it violates the norm that there should not be a war, your nation Γ cannot help but suffer a devastating loss in the long term. Therefore, you have to observe the norm in terms of Γ 's national interest.” Let me stipulate the norm in a following manner to make the third persuasion even more convincing.

Contract W: Nation states should not wage war. If a nation violates the borders of other nations, the rest of nations are obliged to support the nation invaded with their own military powers.

According to Contract W, if nation Γ invades another nation Δ , the rest of nations A, B, and E will support Δ immediately with their military powers. Since there is no remarkable difference among their military powers given Presupposition 2 of world model N, there is very little probability that nation Γ will win the war. Then, the persuasion to γ based on weighing Γ 's advantages and disadvantages seems to be justified rationally, at least within world model N.

However, unfortunately, there is an easy way out of the measure against war through alliances between nation states by secret agreements. For example, let us assume that nation Γ allies with nations A and B by a secret agreement. After that, if Γ invades nation Δ , then Γ can gain huge military advantage over Δ even if E supports Δ by observing Contract W. Of course, the nations can be made to abide by the contract through establishing another norm, V, which prohibits such secret agreements. However, γ can criticize the effects of norm V based on similar counterarguments. Consequently, considering such maneuvers, I cannot help but conclude that the persuasion based on weighing long-term advantages and disadvantages lacks absolute rationality.

4 Probability of war in the actual world

4.1 Comparison between the world model and the actual world

In the previous two sections, I examined the extent to which ethics can be justified at the level of individuals and nation states within a simplified artificial model. What,

then, can I propose about the problem in our actual situation? Let us investigate it by referring to the previous arguments.

At the level of individuals: In the actual world, it is not the case that such serious moral vices as murder go through the procedure that all of us agree to contract a norm. Usually, such a norm has already been stipulated in the form of various laws in a nation state. However, this fact does not make any crucial difference to the argument in section 2. For example, let us assume that a Japanese citizen M decides privately to violate Japanese criminal laws to commit murder whenever it is possible to do. Then, we will attempt to persuade M through arguments that are similar to the three described above. However, the argument based on agreeing to a contract (Argument 1) becomes much feebler because M does not agree to contract the Japanese criminal law in the actual world as opposed to how it was set up in world model P. Thus he can fairly insist that he is not obliged to observe the law.

Another significant difference is that since the state power guarantees the execution of law in the actual world, the persuasion based on Argument 3 (weighing M's long-term advantages) becomes still more convincing than in world model P. However, because there remains a possibility that a crime will not be revealed even under state power, this persuasion has its own limitations. In addition, in the actual world, there are individuals who do not satisfy the presupposition of world model P (that they want to stay alive and have desires that they want to satisfy). Needless to say that Argument 3 will not have any substantial effect on such individuals.

On the level of nation states, as indicated in the previous section, an important difference between the assumption in world model N and the situation in the actual international society is that the norm prohibiting wars does not yet exist as an international law in the latter (such international treaties as the Geneva Convention stipulate humanitarian norms *only during war time*). Thus, the normative constraint against such moral vices as wars in the actual world can be said to be much weaker than in world model N.

Furthermore, I must point out another important difference between world model N and actual international society. It is evident that the actual international society does not satisfy Presupposition 2 of world model N: there is no remarkable difference in size and quality among nation states. In fact, there are huge imbalances in size and quality among actual nation states. For example, when it comes to GDP share in 2010 (nominal, \$), the sum of two nations, the United States and Japan, is about 30% and that of 31 nations (OECD member nations plus China) is about 80%⁶. This suggests that the security of the actual world is much more unstable than that of world model N.

On the other hand, the actual international society is similar to world model N in one important respect. In both worlds, there is no super-nation state above and beyond nation states. Of course, there is the United Nations in the actual world. However, since the UN is controlled by permanent members of the Security Council, it cannot be said to be a super-nation state that governs all members equally.

This is what may cause a significant difference about moral awareness between individuals under state power and nation states as sovereigns in international society. For example Kant says that individuals can become mature in terms of morality while

⁶Cf., http://www5.cao.go.jp/j-j/wp/wp-je11/h05_hz020101.html

nation states remain infantile⁷. Soseki Natsume, a Japanese novelist, also writes, “[b]y their nature, countries ... do not show the same concerns in relation to morality. They engage in devious maneuvers, are hypocritical and cheating. Great confusion results from this behavior”⁸. This striking difference in the moral agency between individuals and nation states seems to result from the condition of the presence of a state apparatus that governs individuals and the absence of super-nation state apparatus governing nation states.

Let me summarize the argument of this section. In actual international society, (1) there is no statute law that prohibits wars as opposed to world model N, (2) there is huge imbalance in size and quality between nation states as opposed to the stipulation of Presupposition 2 of world model N, and (3) there is no super-state apparatus above nation states that corresponds to the state apparatus in the case of individuals. These facts indicate that the security of the actual world is much more unstable than that of world model N. In other words, the affinity with war in the actual world is much higher than in world model N.

4.2 Drives toward War

In this section, I will point out the substantial drives toward war that exist in the present circumstances.

The exponential growth of the economy and population⁹ since the capitalistic social constitution came into existence, in other words, since commodity exchange (exchange mode C) became dominant, has made human beings confront various natural “limits to growth”¹⁰. One such limit is, needless to say, depletion of fossil fuels as non-renewable resources. (The accident of the nuclear power plant in Fukushima caused by the earthquake in Tohoku on March 11th of last year, as you know, is one consequence of this fundamental problem about natural resources. For it is certain that nuclear power generation is a very attractive alternative to thermal power generation, especially to nations that have only scarce fossil fuels, such as Japan).

The more primal fossil fuels will deplete, the more will grow the friction and conflict between nations rich in fossil fuels and those poor in them. Of course, nation states poor in natural resources can buy them at the international market, but if the fuel prices continue to rise drastically as the depletion increases rapidly, and if the military force of a nation poor in them is overwhelmingly dominant over that of a nation rich in them, then the former’s motivation for invading the latter will necessarily grow.

Another, much more serious fact follows from the development of commodity exchange (exchange mode C): capital. Capital grows as it makes profits through commodity exchange. How, then, does capital make this profit? It makes profit from *difference*¹¹. Merchant capital, an early form of capital, makes profit by transporting a commod-

⁷Cf., Kant, I, *Was ist Aufklärung?*, Felix Meiner, 1999.

⁸Natsume, Soseki, *My Individualism and The Philosophical Foundations of Literature*, by Tsunematsu, Sammy I (tr.), Tuttle Publishing, 2004, p.57.

⁹Cf., Malthus, P, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, W W Norton & Co Inc, 1976.

¹⁰Cf., Meadows, Donella H, et al., *The Limits to Growth*, Universe Books, 1972.

¹¹Strictly speaking, the following explanation that capital gains profit from difference is derived not directly from Marx’s theory but from Karanani’s and Katsuhito Iwai’s, economist. Cf., Iwai, Katsuhito, *Venice*

ity from a region abundant in it to another region scarce in it. That is, merchant capital makes profit from spatial differences between a value system in a region abundant in a commodity and another value system in one scarce in it. Industrial capital gains profit from the fact that abundant labor reserves in rural areas keep wages considerably low following the supply-demand relationship in the labor market. Here, industrial capital makes profit from spatial differences between rural and urban areas. Then, as capitalism develops further, the growth of labor productivity by technological innovations can produce more value than that of labor paid by wages. Here, capital can be said to gain profit from the temporal difference between value systems that are enabled by incessant technological innovation¹².

However, as Marx pointed out, the rate of profit falls in general as capital develops¹³. When the differential processes of capital by export and import trade and domestic consumption have been saturated within advanced capitalistic nations, the direct transportation of capital to foreign nations that have been relatively separated from the world market so far, in other words, the multi-nationalization of capital becomes active. This phenomenon is called “globalism.” The direct transportation of capital overseas is, in short, that a corporation, for example a Japanese corporation, repeats in a developing nation the same developing process of capital in order to capture profit as it has already carried out in the home nation.

However, this process of globalization causes a conflict between capitals (exchange mode C) and nation states (exchange mode B). For instance, any Japanese corporation can sustain its capital growth by direct investment overseas (globalization) while the nation state (Japan) cannot impose taxes on the profits that the corporation makes overseas. Yet, a nation state must sustain the cycle of its own exchange mode—plunder-redistribution—at any cost in order to survive as a nation state. Therefore, the condition in which the rate of profit falls while the differential process of capital attains its limit domestically is bound to intensify the imperialistic motivation of a nation state for invading other nations in order to keep functioning in exchange mode B. Furthermore, another general tendency is that the more a nation’s economy advances, the more its military power grows, increasing the probability of a war. This argument can be summarized as follows.

Development of capital → Tendential fall of the rate of profit → Direct investment overseas (globalization) → Malfunction of a nation state (exchange mode B) and powerful regular army → Imperialistic motivation

no Syonin no Shihonron, Chikumagakugeibumko, 1992. Karatani, *ibid*.

¹²It is nothing but Marx’s *relative surplus value*. Cf., Marx, K, *Das Kapital*, Bd.I, Karl Diez Verlag, 2008.

¹³To be exact, it is “the tendential fall in the rate of profit by the rise of capital’s organic composition.” “The rise of capital’s organic composition” means that the ratio of variable capital V (labor power) to constant capital C (means of production, etc.) falls. Assuming that the rate of surplus value (profit/C) is constant, the rate of profit (profit/(C + V)) falls as the rise of capital’s organic composition grows. Cf., Marx, K, *Das Kapital*, Bd.III, Karl Diez Verlag, 2010. Karatani, *ibid.*, 2003.

5 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

This is what I propose regarding the extent to which the ethics (morals) of nation states can be founded and the actual situation of our world. The perspective might sound too pessimistic; however, I want to emphasize that I have not attempted to exaggerate or paint an overly pessimistic picture to attract your attention. If this perspective is valid, it can be said that we live closer to potential wars on a daily basis than we understand. What is more, a devastating war will break out in the near future almost certainly if we stand by doing nothing. Even if we reflect repeatedly on the disastrous results of wars and march to protest against actual or potential wars, this would not be sufficient to eradicate the possibility of war completely. For example, a representative X of a nation state would use any means necessary to enable his own nation state and people to enjoy its prosperity, however morally virtuous he might be, because a nation state is nothing but an exchange mode B. Ironically, the more competent and sincere he is as a representative, the more dangerous the means to which he resorts becomes. Today, the choices that an advanced nation can make to continue enjoying its prosperity get increasingly narrow.

According to foregoing argument in 3-2, if a representative decides to make war in the interest of his nation, we could not prevent him from making the decision by any rational argument. However, what is most important is that he could decide otherwise because he is an agent with free will. Of course, we can also move into action to realize peace in the sense defined at the beginning because we are also agents with free will.

What, then, can or should we do in order to prevent this emergent crisis? I don't have enough time to argue the grave and complicated problem any further, but let me introduce an appealing proposal that seems apt for this occasion¹⁴.

The proposal is that Japan should renounce its military power (the Self-Defense Forces) by following Article 9 of the constitution literally. Japan is a unique nation in a few respects. It is the only nation to have experienced nuclear bombing. It is also the only nation (except Costa Rica¹⁵) whose constitution stipulates the renunciation of war and military power definitely. Whether Article 9 was legislated by Japan or by the United States during its occupation of GHQ has been under dispute¹⁶. However, it does not matter for our case. What is important is that the renunciation of war and military power is clearly stipulated in the Constitution of Japan.

In actuality, however, Japan began to rearm under a geopolitical power balance in 1951 and has maintained friendly relations with the United States based on the Japan-US Security Treaty. Since then we, Japanese, have lived with this evident contradiction between Article 9 and the Self-Defense Forces.

It is logical in a sense that the nationalist parties of Japan require a constitutional amendment of Article 9 in order to resolve this contradiction (though I have never agreed with this proposal). Presupposing that Japan maintains its military power, there is no other option but to revise the constitution in order to resolve this inconsistency. However, an amendment to the Japanese constitution needs a majority of votes in the

¹⁴The following proposal is greatly inspired by Karatani, *ibid*, 2011.

¹⁵Costa Rica became the world's first 'unarmed permanent neutral nation' in 1983. Cf., Tabata, S, et al., *Hisen Heiwa no Ronri*, Horitsu bunkasha, 1992.

¹⁶Cf., Tabata, *ibid*.

referendum that can be proposed based on a two-thirds vote in the diet. Judging from my impression based on having led life in Japan, the bitter memories of defeat in World War II inscribed in the unconscious minds of the Japanese people will lead them to resist an amendment of the constitution intensely.

The other option to resolve the contradiction is, as I said, to renounce military power by following Article 9 literally. In concrete terms, for example, Japan will declare renunciation of its military power in the UN General Assembly and gift its military arsenals to the UN in a phased manner. Through the gift, Japan can also pay restitution for the crimes that it committed during World War II. The responsibility for the crimes committed by Japan in the war has been especially vague because the head of our state during the war (Showa Emperor) survived the war, in contrast to the leaders of Germany and Italy.

Is the proposal unrealistic? It might be so for other nations that do not have constitutions stipulating renunciation of military power because they might have to revise their constitutions in order to carry out such a proposal. For Japan, on the contrary, revising the constitution to legitimize maintaining of military power is much more unreal than renouncing it.

Once a nation state renounces its military power, it cannot go to war. Furthermore, if a regular army is intrinsic to a nation state as exchange mode B (plunder-redistribution), renunciation of it is tantamount to dissolution of the nation state. It is evident that the disappearance of a nation state implies disappearance of the possibility of war.

The renunciation of military power has significant implications as it is, in a sense, a gift, which corresponds to exchange mode A: reciprocation. How will international society reward this gift? Will any nation, including yours, return by renouncing its military power? I believe that this can be made possible if Japan takes the lead in renouncing its military power and providing a clear and convincing theory about the current global situation and prospects for the future. At least, I expect that it would be highly improbable that a nation would reward the gift by invading Japan. Does this vision sound too optimistic to you?